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Abstract: 
Emotions are largely absent in economic models. However, many theories still cease to 
explain the actual situations. We combine regular microeconomic theory with emotions. 
We focus on an FDI decision of a firm, including both business-economics and emotional 
variables in the firms decision-making process.Theoretically, emotions are included in a 
utility maximization model, by not only considering the utility of the firm but also the 
utility of the decision-maker. Empirically, the presence of emotions in FDI decision-
making is tested using a sample of Dutch enterprises that considered an investment in 
Central or Eastern Europe between 1990 and 2000. 
 
Key results: 
Adding emotions to economic theory can enhance our understanding of the reality. The 
empirical results showed that emotions are important in economic decision-making. The 
presence of positive emotions increased the chance of Dutch firms to engage in an FDI in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
 Unlike Dr Spock cruising the Galaxy in his Voyager, most humans are not stripped of 
their emotions when making decisions. But equally most humans do not possess Dr. 
Spock’s information processing capacities when making choices (Earl, 2001). This is 
nevertheless how economic analysis models human decisions. Standard rational choice 
models and the bulk of empirical studies on microeconomic choice behavior use a rational 
choice model wherein little room is left for emotions to play a role, let alone a decisive 
one. The skills required to select and to handle the information that is needed to guarantee 
the rationality of the choice, are assumed to be abundantly available among human 
decision-makers. This assumption is not different in the study of foreign direct investment 
(FDI ) decisions. The complicated processes leading to a decision either to invest or not 
and where to invest (geographically) are notoriously difficult to model and the last thing 
that we need is more complication in terms of emotions playing a role. Direct investment-
decisions are assumed to be based on estimates of the Net Present Values of all investment 
options and the final decision on whether or not to proceed with the investment in a 
particular country is assumed to be based on the ranking of all options (including the 
negative one of not to invest) in terms of their estimated Net Present Value. 
 When preparing a survey on investment-decisions of Dutch firms in Central and 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia we explored the many reasons that might have played a 
role during open interviews with investors. During these discussions, approximately half 
of the respondents implied that “emotional” elements played a role in making final choices 
both regarding the decision to invest and the final choice of the country. Considerations 
such as the fact that the manager had participated in an exchange program during his/her 
study in that specific country, the fact that the partner of (one of) the owner(s) holds 
citizenship of the host country or that a personal acquaintance asked the Dutch firm to take 
over the foreign business, were among the important factors quoted to have been decisive 
elements in the decision process. These considerations seem far away from the algorithms 
of pure rational choice, but the question is whether they are. 
 In this paper we explore theoretically how emotions can be seen as compliments to 
rational choice processes and illustrate empirically that emotional factors do play a role in 
foreign direct investment-decisions. Section two includes a description of the economic 
decision-making literature including emotions and a framework that can be used to include 
emotions in investment-decisions. In section three a simple utility maximizing decision-
making model will be described, with the specifications on how to include emotions. 
Section four provides empirical evidence that emotions are an influencing factor in the 
FDI  decision-making process, using the data from a survey among Dutch enterprises 
considering a foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe. The paper 
concludes that adding emotions to FDI  theory enhances our understanding of the actual 
decision processes. 
 
2. Emotions and investment-decision-making 
2.1 Rationality and bounded rationality 
Recent contributions in investment-decision-making literature have expanded the 
commonly used Net Present Value or Utility based models of foreign direct investment by 
including the effects uncertainty and irreversibility of investments (often referred to as the 
option literature, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). In these more sophisticated 
models pure rationality including full information is still very dominant, like in many areas 
in economics.i Within the economic literature there are several models or theories that 
question those rationality assumptions, like the theory of bounded rationality. Given 
rational choice, firms may not be utility (profit) maximizing and full information is absent. 
Decision-making under uncertainty is hard, since predicting the future is hard and humans 
face cognitive limitation. Those critiques are largely accepted and theory is adjusted based 
on empirical evidence (Simon, 1997)ii. The decision-making solution bounded rationality 
offers is that firms do not attempt to search for all investment possibilities but choose a for 
all parties satisficing solution (Simon, 1997). 
Cognitive limitations can be a source of explaining the large influence of personal 
motivations in investment-decisions. Given decision-makers face cognitive limitations, 
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they have to rely on other sources of information, or other decision factors when making 
an investment-decision. For FDI decisions it means human cognition is insufficient to 
make complicated expected utility calculations, as often used in investment-decision 
models. It is simply not possible to consider all FDI possibilities available, which means 
considering all countries in the world as possible host countries. Thus, several choices in 
order to limit the possible investment alternatives have to be made before even considering 
an analysis in order to keep the choice options within the boundaries of human cognition. 
Network theories and experience or learning theories can offer tools for firms to make an 
investment-decision. 
Network theory is based on the idea that there is an economic value attached to the 
social network you haveiii. The structure of relations among people and organizations in a 
market can affect or even replace information. Having a network of contact persons, 
relatives and friends or business relations in a country directly provides a firm with 
sources of information. Experience and learning theories can provide another tool to deal 
with cognitive limitationsiv. Having experience with the host country directly or indirectly 
enables a firm to evaluate the experiences and use this knowledge to make the current 
choices. All information sources and experience the firm has in or about the host country, 
in the form of networks, experience and knowledge will lead to a better investment-
decision. Where human cognitive fails to understand and analyze all investment 
possibilities, those factors help the firm to make informed decisions by relying on the 
network of people that can assist you during the investment period and trusting the 
knowledge obtained during previous experiences. 
The concept of bounded rationality can be extended to include information costs. The 
decision-maker not only considers the additional information when making a decision, but 
also takes the costs of collecting information into account during the decision-making 
process. This theory is known as meta-rationality (Wadeson, 2000) 
 
2.2 Defining emotions 
So far the economic explanations, rational and bounded rational, focus on the FDI 
decision-making process. The decision and the decision rules are placed central in by these 
theories. However, psychological literature suggests there are also psychological factors 
influencing the decision-maker, as such influencing the firms choice to invest or not. Such 
psychological aspects remain largely absent from the decision models. In this section one 
aspects of psychological decision-making influencing the decision-maker, emotions, is 
introduced as possible source of explanation of FDI decisions. 
Within the literature there is no consensus on the definition of emotion, each researcher 
generally defines its own working definition of emotions. For this article a commonly used 
definition is adopted, that is suitable for the economic application and abstains from the 
psychological specifications. Emotions are multifaceted processes that unfold over time. 
Emotions are manifest in multiple channels and the channels themselves are loosely 
coupled and interact in a complex way (Venables, 1986, Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999).v 
Emotions are both psychological and physiological and include subjective experiences, 
facial action, central or peripheral nervous system activation, cognitive changes and 
behavioral action tendencies.vi Emotions cannot be directed or prevented, people undergo 
emotions, without tools to resist them.vii There are two kinds of emotions, visceral and 
anticipated. Visceral emotions are immediate emotions that occur at the time of the 
decision, like anger or happiness. Anticipated emotions occur after the decision is made, 
like for instance regret. Visceral emotions are thus more important when making an 
investment-decision. Economists more often use anticipated emotions, even though 
visceral emotions are basic to daily life functioning and decision-making. They are often 
linked to consumer theories, testing for instance to what extent consumers regret their 
purchase. Visceral emotions play an essential role in human behavior, but face two major 
complications. First, they often make people behave in ways that are not necessarily 
beneficial for them and second, people underestimate the effect of visceral factors on their 
own current and future behavior (Loewenstein, 2000).viii 
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2.3 Emotions in economic literature 
The fact that emotions have been largely absent in economic decision theory does not 
mean that emotions are ignored entirely in modern developments in economic analysis. 
Emotions are gaining importance and the discussion on inclusion of the concepts in 
economic theory is becoming more regular (Allen et al., 1992). How individuals behave, 
feel and make a judgment is considered more and more as a crucial determinant of choices 
(Kaufman, 1999). Evidently, in the psychological literature, theories on emotions are more 
popular (see e.g. Lewis and Haviland, 1993; Oatley and Jenkins, 1998; Wollheim, 1999). 
Specific applications of emotions in economics are found in game theory (Bosman and van 
Winden, 2002; Duwfenberg, 2002; Selten, 1998) and consumer behavior (Allen et al., 
1992; van Dolen et al., 2001; Aaker and Willems, 1998). In other fields, research is done 
to see to what extent emotions are linked to decisions. Examples are the studies that link 
happiness and the position in the labor market (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1992,1998; Oswald 1997) and the analyses that explore the relation between 
emotions, culture and economic performance (Casson, 1993; Altman, 2001; Gutter et al., 
1999) and social cognition (Stajkovic et al, 1998). The conclusion of almost all of these 
publications is that emotions are an important significant factor in decision-making. 
Inclusion of emotions in economic models or frameworks is rare. Based on the 
literature we reviewed, the only models integrating emotions and economics are using 
utility theory, measuring emotions as costs and benefits (Loewenstein,1999; Elster ,1998; 
Frank, 1988). Loewenstein highlights the fact that people highly value their current 
emotions and underestimate future emotions when maximizing utility today. He uses 
utility functions, including consumption and emotional states, to show the difference 
between what people should be maximizing versus what they are maximizing due to 
emotions. Translated to firm’s investment-decisions, his argument is that entrepreneurs at 
the moment of their investment-decision behave largely under the influence of their 
emotion that specific day and underestimate the impact of the future. With respect to 
decisions under uncertainty, Loewenstein argues that peoples cognitive evaluation of risks 
often diverge from the emotional reaction to those risks. In other words, a positive country 
risk rating in an economic analysis does not imply the entrepreneur also personally has to 
consider the country equally riskless.ix Elster (1998) states emotions can be seen as 
psychic costs or benefits, which enter in a utility function. Here the valence becomes 
important. Valence implies that emotions can be measured on a scale from low to high. 
Elster uses an example of Becker’s analysis to illustrate the economic integration of 
emotions. Meeting a beggar induces guild of being wealthy yourself, which can be 
considered a (indirect) cost. In addition, you may give money to the beggar to get rid of 
the bad feeling, which is a direct cost. Thus, emotion itself can be cost (or benefit), or the 
emotion can lead to a cost (or benefit). The larger the emotion is, the higher the costs or 
benefits will be in economic terms. Frank (1988) also translates emotions in cost and 
benefit terminology. Examples are the costs and benefits of marriage, or the costs and 
benefits cheating in cooperative ventures. In his appendix he derives a formal version of 
the commitment model, including payoff functions of honest and dishonest persons 
engaging in joint ventures, also taking costs of scrutiny into account. 
However, none of these economic applications combine both economic motivations for 
decisions with emotions. They only describe the influence of emotions and indicate how to 
include them in economics terms, therewith loosing any interaction effects between 
economics and emotions. Kaufman (1999) and Hanoch (2002) do integrate emotions and 
economics; their research will be build upon in section 2.4 
 
2.4 Role of emotions in decision-making 
Even though it becomes more accepted that emotions are influencing decision-making 
processes of individuals, their inclusion in economic theory, without loosing the values of 
emotions, is not simple. Standard economic theory on FDI decision processes under 
uncertainty requires rational agents reviewing options and their probabilities. They should 
estimate the Net Present Value as the main indicator for future success and finally base 
(non) investment-decisions on the ranking of the options according to that indicator and 
the related probabilities. The functionality of the theoretical framework depends crucially 
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on two basic assumptions related to the decision-making and decision-maker, namely 
“given tastes and preferences” and “perfect information”. The outcomes of the economic 
decision-making model is of course a simplification of reality, but leads to interesting 
conclusions. However, those conclusions are only realized when the simplifying 
assumptions are considered to hold. The incorporation of emotions into this particular part 
of theory on the one hand indicates that these assumptions do not always hold, but on the 
other hand may be interpreted as the safeguards of the theory, as will be argued below. 
Stability in tastes and preferences is an important prerequisite for rational choice 
models to work. What is important is that decision-makers know their tastes and 
preferences and once identified adhere to the same preference ordering. The concept of a 
utility curve is based on this stability and known and stable utility curves are a necessity 
for being able to estimate the outcome of the decisions. The model becomes completely 
volatile and unpredictable if an investor for example at one moment prefers higher 
revenues above higher total profit in one particular country, but prefers the opposite the 
next moment or in another country. This is a strong assumption. It not only requires that 
all the decision-makers know their preferences (it is a cognitive framework) but also that 
they do not change them. Emotions do not come in. The assumption of perfect information 
is equally strong, complex and encompassing. It requires that all the information on all 
relevant characteristics of the goods is available to all market parties (to all consumers and 
all producers) and this also requires that perfect information holds even for future markets. 
The assumption of perfect information seems to be very restrictive and it is hard to 
understand how any market can ever comply with these conditions. The introduction of 
emotions will not help us a lot in this context; they complicate the analysis further by 
introducing non-cognitive elements into the decision-making process and further blurring 
the assumption of perfect information. 
The concept of bounded rationality already recognizes these points of critique and 
argues that due to cognitive limitations people settle for a sub-optimal satisficing solution. 
Kaufman (1999) builds on this concept and introduces emotions as an additional source of 
bounded rationality, besides cognition. He argues that, even though the emotional process 
is largely explicable in rational term, the behavior caused by emotional states can be 
irrational. Insufficient or excessive emotions cause sub-optimal decisions or performance. 
With too little emotional intensity people suffer from insufficient physical and mental 
arousal to perform optimally, while too much emotions cause a person to be so aroused 
that thinking and physical self-control become disorganized and this deteriorates 
performance as well. Applying Kaufman’s theory to decision-making, the absence of 
emotions will lead to worse choices than in the presence of limited degree of emotions, as 
long as they do not become excessive. However, in Kaufman’s approach, emotions can 
never improve decision-making. They not only lead to weaker performance compared to 
neo-classical economic solutions, but also lead to a deterioration compared to the bounded 
rationality solution. Or, as Kaufman states, they add a source of bounded rationality, 
extending the effect of bounded rationality due to cognitive limitations with additional 
emotional distortions. 
Following the line of reasoning of Hanoch (2002), we would like to turn the argument 
around and argue that allowing emotions to play a role in the decision-making process 
actually rescues the rational choice model in a particular way. The basic argument is that, 
even without emotions, the assumption of stable preferences and perfect information 
cannot be believed to hold. In other words, there is always imperfect information and 
tastes and preferences are never stable. Decision makers need a device to deal with 
instability in preferences and imperfect information. This device is the recognition that 
emotions exist and are allowed to enter the decision-making process (the cognitive 
acceptance of emotions). Hanoch (2002) elaborates the stable taste argument in detail. His 
main point is that emotions can function as a tool to prioritize tastes and preferences. 
Time, or attention is a scarce resource and people simply cannot analyze all preference 
decisions. Given in reality preferences are not stable, but fluctuate per situation and over 
time, adjustments in priorities are constantly made. This can be done in a slow, analytical 
manner, but also quick, based on emotions and intuition. Hanoch argues these quick 
decisions are not necessarily the best solutions, even though sometimes they are, but they 
are satisficing solutions.x 
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A second argument Hanoch makes is that individuals are not “cold calculating 
machines” and feelings or intuition directly affect and change priorities. And last he argues 
that people do not have the cognitive ability to calculate future probabilities (calculating 
what will happen), but instead they imagine what may happen. In this imagination, 
emotions can play large roles. 
With respect to the lack of perfect information, Hanoch argues intuition can serve as a 
tool to make decisions. We extend this argument for FDI decisions. Foreign direct 
investment-decisions are based on a process that can be subdivided in different phases. For 
convenience purposes we distinguish five phases: 
1. Start searching for investment opportunities; 
2. Select information to consider; 
3. Interpret the information collected; 
4. Stop searching; 
5. Evaluate the options and decide. 
In each of the phases perfect information is a near impossibility: it requires that all 
investment opportunities are considered before taking a decision and this not only at any 
given moment but also at any given moment in the future. It also requires that all the 
relevant information is available and collected, interpreted and evaluated by an investor. 
This is unrealistic. No investor will be able to review all (including the future ones) 
investment opportunities before making a decision. Nor will an investor be able to grasp 
the complexity of all the information that becomes available and evaluate it in an 
internally consistent way. All investors need a device to limit the options and to allow 
them to make a decision on less than perfect information. This device can be the use of 
emotions. They can become a functional tool in actually making decisions by helping the 
investor to limit the review and decision process. 
Emotions may trigger off search in some circumstances and withhold investors from 
searching in others, limiting the alternatives that an investor considers. Emotions may help 
the investor to interpret the (imperfect) information and emotions finally may assist the 
investor in deciding when to stop searching or evaluating. Interpreted in this particular 
way, it is not surprising that emotions are observed to play a crucial role in investment-
decisions. They do not replace calculations or rational considerations; they make them 
possible by limiting the costs.xi 
Emotions can be included in an economic choice model in different ways. The two 
extreme variations are either not to include emotions and intuition at all in the decision-
making and only use economic arguments (slow, analytical decisions), or to base a 
decision only on emotions or intuition and exclude any economic arguments (quick 
emotional decision). More likely are combinations in decision-making, using both aspects. 
The decision-maker then takes economic and emotional aspects of a decision into account 
and together they determine the outcome of the decision.  
A less direct way for emotions to be involved in decision-making is by influencing all 
other variables determining the final decision. Limiting the number of variables and 
estimating a value of economic indicators used in a calculation is not a uniformly decided 
procedure for all decision-makers. Different variables will be selected by different 
individuals and interpreted differently. Emotions can then be used as a tool to deal with 
imperfect information in order to limit the information and will also influence 
interpretation of the variables, for instance through imagination. An example is valuation 
of an indicator, which is nominally equal for all decision-makers, like for instance the 
GDP of a country. The valuation and interpretation still varies per decision-maker and 
depends very much on the emotion of the decision-maker. What one person will consider 
as a sufficiently high GDP, can be an insufficiently low GDP for another decision-maker. 
It is impossible to say if emotional decisions will lead to more successful decisions than 
a decision following only economic arguments. The main question is if the two can even 
be considered separately. Emotions do influence decision-making and empirical research 
almost always points out that emotions are influential and significant. It is thus hard to 
explain that emotional behavior has not been included in direct decision-making models so 
far and empirically the impact of emotional factors on direct investment-decisions has not 
been tested. In the third section of this paper we will therefore model a decision-making 
framework that includes both business economic decision-making factors and emotional 
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influences. 
 
3. A decision-making model including an emotional coefficient 
The principle of a utility maximization model is followed, in which individuals are 
considered rational in economic sense, meaning they are utility maximizing. We realize 
the inconsistency here, in using a rational neoclassical model, based on assumptions we 
earlier called unrealistic. However, in section 2.4 we argued exactly that emotions could 
be the tools to make models work given that the assumptions are not realistic. 
In this model the investment-decision of a firm is based both the utility of the firm and 
the utility of the decision-maker. These two components are separately included in the 
additive utility function. Emotional influences will be present in both parts of the function 
 
(1) max. U(FDI) = U(firm) + U(decision-maker)  
 
The rational analytical decision-making variables are included in the first part of the 
utility function, for instance by defining the highest utility of the firm as the investment 
possibility with the highest Expected Net Present Value. Thus, U(firm) can be replaced 
with U(E(NPV)), where firms will invest as soon as the expected NPV is positive.xii 
Emotions inherently influence the valuation of NPV, given that emotions are used to select 
investment alternatives, information sources, value indicators and make future prognoses 
or imaginations. The utility based on the expected net present value is visualized in figure 
one. 
 
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
The utility is positive (negative respectively) when the E(NPV) is positive (negative). 
The marginal utility curve of E(NPV) is always positive, increasing when the E(NPV) is 
negative, highest when E(NPV) = 0 and afterwards declining towards zero. 
The factors determining the utility of the decision-maker are less clear.xiii Imagine an 
entrepreneur who considers to invest in Poland or not. The “business part” of the decision, 
being the profit expectations, is already incorporated in the utility of the firm. The 
“personal preferences” of the businessman are included in the utility of the decision-
maker. If the entrepreneur wants to go to Poland, enjoys living abroad and believes he will 
be successful, he will have a high positive utility, higher than his personal utility of not 
investing. If on the other hand the businessman has a family that does not want to join him 
to Poland, he has sad feelings when considering investing and his personal utility of not 
investing will be higher. While intuitively clear, the most important problem is how to 
measure these personal preferences. How do you specify emotions and the intensity of 
emotions (see for instance Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999; Van Dolen et al., 2001; Blamey, 
1998; Bosman and van Winden, 2002)? In general, each study selects a number of 
emotions, which are specifically related to their research. Emotional variables that could 
be included in the investment-decision-making function are for instance variables related 
to Emotional Intelligence (instinct, intuition), Emotional Involvement (interest, love, hate), 
Self-Efficacy (confidence and trust), Individual Experience and Individual Relations (trust, 
comfort, familiarity, safety). These factors will therefore be introduced in the empirical 
section of this article. However, how to measure those factors and how to transform them 
to interpretable variables is a difficult issue. 
In order to make the utility of the decision-maker comparable to the utility of the 
expected NPV, the inputs in the utility function of the decision-maker, here called 
emotions (ε), need to be translated into money value. By dividing the utility of the 
emotions over the marginal utility of money (M)xiv, an Emotional Coefficient (EC) displays 
the additional revenue in money terms a decision-maker gets due to emotions (see 
equation two). 
 
(2) EC = U(ε) / U’(M)  
 
The utility of emotions U(EC) is visualized in figure 2a,b and c. Figure 2a describes the 
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size of emotions, when taking the size of a firm into account. The larger a firm is, the 
smaller is the influence of emotions on the decision-making. A small firm has only one 
decision-maker that is personally affected by the decision. The emotions of the decision-
maker will weight more heavily during the decision-making process, than if a decision is 
taken by a large multinational corporation, following a standard investment procedure. The 
same downward slope exists for the utility of money. Smaller firms have less money 
available, they will have a larger utility of money than larger firms. Thus, the marginal 
utility of money will be declining as firms increase in size, but will remain positive (see 
figure 2b). 
 
INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
Combining emotions and the marginal utility of money in the utility function of 
emotions, U(EC), these two effects level out for small and large firms. Small firms will 
have a higher level of ε, but also a higher level of U’(M) and large firms will have lower 
influences by emotions, but also a lower marginal utility of money. Therefore the utility 
function of emotions will be increasing with positive emotions, but with diminishing 
returns.xv Including these specifications in equation one gives 
 
(3) U(FDI) = U(E(NPV) + U(EC) 
 
Considering the additive utility function (equation one) adding the utility functions of 
the E(NPV) (figure one) and the emotional coefficient (figure 2c), a firm will only invest if 
either both utilities are positive, or if one of the two factors is dominating positively.  
The theory thus coincides with the literature described in section 2.4. If an investment-
decision is taken following the rational, slow approach, the decision is based only on the 
utility obtained from the economic calculations. In this model that would mean that 
U(E(NPV)) is the sole factor in decision-making and U(EC) is not considered. If, on the 
other hand, the quick, emotional approach is taken, U(EC) is the sole factor of decision-
making and economic calculations are not valued. More likely is the scenario that 
economic calculations and emotional influences jointly determine decision-making. If 
U(E(NPV)) and U(EC) are both positive or both negative, the decision to invest or not will 
not be hard. If however U(E(NPV) and U(EC) are of contradicting sign, the decision will 
be more uncertain.xvi 
Interactions between the two utility factors are also possible. If the utility from 
emotions U(EC) is strongly positive, these strong positive emotions could positively 
influence business-economic perspective of the market as well. Equally, if a high expected 
NPV can give the decision-maker happy or exciting feelings. To include interaction effects 
in the model, an interaction effect containing U(E(NPV)*EC) can be added to the model. 
In section four these theoretical possibilities of investment-decisions including 
emotions will be tested. The tests will first show if the presence of emotional quick 
decision-making exists in large investment-decision like setting up an FDI. Second will be 
checked whether emotional variables are indeed, besides economic variables, included in 
the investment-decision-making. And last we will look whether the presence of emotions 
has a positive or negative influence on decision-making. 
 
4. Empirical test of the impact of emotions on decision-making 
In both the literature overview in section two and model in section three we claim 
emotions play an important role in decision-making. In this section we use a dataset of 
Dutch firms to empirically test whether emotions play a significant role in their investment 
choices. 
 
4.1 The database 
In 2000 a survey has been undertaken among 1592 Dutch firms that had participated in 
a seminar on investments in Central and Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union 
(CEEC and FSU) between 1990 and 2000. Those firms did not necessarily have an 
investment in the region by the time they were participating in the survey, but they had an 
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interest in investing in the region. 23.4 percent of the companies responded to our survey. 
For this analysis only those firms that seriously considered investing in a direct investment 
during 1989-1999 were included, in total 219 firms, among which 79 investors in the CEE 
region and 140 non-investors in the CEE region.xvii A non-response bias analysis indicated 
there was a small response bias in favor of larger older firms and firms with an investment 
in the CEE region. In order to take this into account, the analyses of the data are done with 
and without correction for this non-response bias. In this article the unweighted results are 
displayed, in which each observation is weighted as one. In the tables in appendix one both 
the unweighted and weighted results are shown. A comparison of the weighted and 
unweighted results shows no significant differences.  
 
4.2 The results 
The survey included several questions that could shed light on the so-called non-
economic or personal motivations entrepreneurs have when making an investment-
decision, as well as the frequency these factors are indeed influential in the decision. 
Presence of such personal motivations means a channel for emotions to influence 
investment-decisions. Appendix two includes the questions which answers are discussed 
in this section. Question 21 asked firms if they made an investment analysis. Firms were 
free to define for themselves what to consider an analysis and were asked to mention as 
well if they made it for one or several countries. 59 percent of the firms did not make any 
investment analysis. For non-investors this percentage is higher than for the investors (75 
percent versus 28 percent respectively).xviii This large percentage of non-investors not 
making an analysis is partly the result of the 168 firms that indicated they did not even 
consider an FDI in the CEE region, either because they were not interested in an FDI or 
because they were not interested in investing in the CEE region. The reasons mostly 
mentioned why firms did not make any investment calculation were: 
 
• They were not interested in an FDI in general. 
• They were not interested in the CEE region to invest in. 
• They had already personal relations with individuals in the respective country. 
• They received an invitation of a business partner in the host country to invest in 
their company or extended existing business relations with a business partner. 
• Investing was a logical result after opening of the market and growth of the 
market. 
• The country was the only possibility to invest in due to availability of certain 
natural resources. 
 
From this question becomes evident that many firms do not use investment analysis as 
a tool for decision-making. They have other motivations why to invest or not, and know 
without further research whether they want to invest or not. 
The second question, question 23 in appendix two, is an open question. The 
participating companies that did make an investment analysis could specify the four most 
important actions/steps during their decision-making process. Given the question was 
raised as an open question it led to a large variety of answers. The choice of country or 
location and doing a market/company analysis are clearly important factors in the 
decision-making for both investors and non-investors. Previous business relations and 
contacts in the country are quite often mentioned as well as separate motivation to 
consider in the investment process. More surprising, investors often mention personal 
motivations; 12,5 percent of all investors indicated one important factor in their decision-
making was of a clear personal nature. This is even more remarkable given the fact that of 
the firms that finally did not invest, no personal motivations were given by any of the 
respondents. Personal contacts and personal experience with a country were mentioned by 
a significant amount of the both investors and non-investors, indicating these aspects as 
important in their decision-making process. The results highlight that companies that do 
make an investment analysis also incorporate personal related variables in their decision-
making process. The personal motivations are more often mentioned by the firms that did 
invest, which could mean that personal motivations can be of importance in the investment 
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choice in the case of FDI decision. In other words, it seems that once there is a personal 
motivation, the chance the investment is made is much higher. We test that hypothesis 
later on in this paragraph. 
The third closed question from the questionnaire among Dutch businesses was included 
to test whether some specific personal factors play a role in decision-making analysis. All 
firms that seriously considered an investment in the CEE region, irrespective whether they 
finally invested or not, were asked if several personal variables influenced their decision 
regarding their investment in the region. If these factors are marked as important, personal 
motivations do influence decision-making. If they are marked significantly more by those 
firms that did invest in the CEE region than by non-investors, it is an indication that 
personal motivations positively influence foreign direct investment-decisions in this 
region. 
• The personal variables included in the question were: 
• Having an available contact-person in the country. 
• The owner or an employee of the Dutch firm, or the partner, family, friends or 
relatives of the owner have the nationality of the host economy. 
• The owner or an employee of the Dutch firm, or the partner, family, friends or 
relatives of the owner are willing to work in the host country. 
• There is language knowledge available within the firm. 
• The owner has positive personal experiences with the country in which the firm 
considers to invest.  
Several of those variables, specifically number one and two, are related to having 
personal relations or a network in the host country. Having a network not only means 
having a source of information provision for the firm. It also positively influences the 
feelings of the decision-maker. Having relations in a country can for instance result in a 
more secure feeling with respect to the investment. Having the nationality of the host 
country also implies there is always a personal involvement with that specific country. 
Again, besides all the economic benefits of having networks and experience with the 
country, the emotional involvement with respect to the investment-decision is probably a 
lot higher. Likewise, if an individual is personally interested in spending time in the host 
economy, the outcome of the investment-decision will personally affect the individual and 
this influences the final decision. There will be some degree of self-efficacy as well. If a 
person considers working in the country himself, he or she is very likely convinced of the 
success of the investment. Language knowledge will probably also lead to a larger self-
efficacy. This self-efficacy is likely to positively stimulate the development of building a 
network sooner and deal with processes and institutions more easy. Positive personal 
experience increase the involvement of an individual with the country. This results in more 
positive images when thinking about the country and thereby also feel more confident in 
engaging in an FDI there. 
Table two in appendix one shows the numbers and percentages of firms that responded 
to each of the above mentioned variables. The variable “contacts in the CEE region” is of 
crucial importance in the decision-making process. Almost 70 percent of all firms 
answered that having contacts in the region was a specific reason for their company to 
choose the country they were considering. Positive experiences, language knowledge and 
family or friends from the region also play important roles in the decision-making process. 
Firms that did invest in the region indicate more often that personal variables influenced 
their decision. However, for none of the variables the difference between investors and 
non-investors was significant.xix 
So far, all three tests indicate that personal factors are important in the decision-making 
process. First, personal motivations could be a reason for firms not to make any 
investment calculation. Second, if firms do make an investment calculation they often do 
include personal related variables in their calculation. Thus, it is interesting to test whether 
or not personal variables do influence the final investment-decision. Is it fair to say that 
those firms that do have some personal link with the investment are also more likely to set 
up an FDI in a transition country? 
In order to check that we created four different personal coefficients dummy variables. 
The variable no analysis is a dummy variable, which is 0 in case companies made an 
investment analysis and one if they made no analysis but made the decision based on other 
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factors. In addition there are three personal variables to indicate the extent to which 
personal influences were included in a decision-making analysis. In appendix one we 
included a description how those personal variables were composed. The control variables 
included are a sector variablexx, age of the Dutch firm at the time if the FDI decisionxxi and 
size of the Dutch firm measured in number of employees at the time of the FDI 
decisionxxii. The results of the logit analysis displayed in table four include the results of 
the unweighted analysis. With respect to the dummy variables capturing personal 
influences, the difference between the unweighted analysis and weighted analysis included 
in appendix one in terms of size of the coefficients is considerable, but there are no 
changes in significance of the variables. The interpretation of the coefficients thus remains 
the same.xxiii 
 
Table 1: Logit analysis on who invests in the CEE region and who does not 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Basic 
No 
Analysis Personal1 Personal2 Personal3 
Agriculture 0.274 0.446 -0.044 -0.255 -0.081 
 (0.59) (0.93) (0.09) (0.47) (0.15) 
Construction -0.296 -0.129 -0.312 0.070 0.838 
 (0.48) (0.20) (0.47) (0.10) (0.94) 
Transport 1.210 1.149 1.146 1.385 1.477 
 (2.22)* (2.04)* (2.03)* (2.25)* (1.94) 
Trade 0.172 0.152 0.065 0.258 0.143 
 (0.42) (0.36) (0.15) (0.54) (0.28) 
Other 1.110 1.132 0.839 0.822 0.819 
 (2.18)* (2.17)* (1.55) (1.38) (1.27) 
Age -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 
 (2.41)* (2.13)* (2.21)* (2.14)* (1.38) 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.43) (1.57) (1.60) (1.92) (2.65)** 
No analysis  1.359    
  (3.40)**    
Personal1   1.640   
   (4.26)**   
Personal2    2.353  
    (6.70)**  
Personal3     3.771 
     (6.91)** 
Constant -0.445 -0.754 -0.731 -1.432 -3.171 
 (1.46) (2.31)* (2.26)* (3.76)** (5.23)** 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.1093 0.1346 0.2476 0.3849 
Source: Survey Dutch Direct Investment in CEEC and FSU, Maastricht University, 2000 
225 observations 
1) The sector industry is taken as baseline sector. 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent 
 
Five different versions of the regression are included. The first model only has control 
variables and the additional four models each include one of the four dummy variables for 
personal influences. The main conclusion is that personal influences do have a positive 
significant impact on the decision-making, meaning that those firms that indicated 
personal factors played a role have a higher chance of being investors. In the basic model 
(Model one) the only significant control factors are the variables sector and age of the 
firm. Firms operating in the sectors transport and other are more likely to invest in the 
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CEE region than firms in the sector industry. Age influences the investment-decision 
negatively, indicating that older firms are less likely to invest in an FDI in a transition 
country than younger firms. In model two is tested whether a decision without making an 
investment analysis increases the chance a firm will invest in the CEE region. Indeed this 
is the case, since the coefficient of the variable no analysis is positive and significant at a 
five percent level. So firms that did not make an investment-decision based on an analysis 
but decided based on other motivations, are more likely to invest in an FDI in the CEE 
region. For the personal variables included in the decision-making analysis (Model three, 
four and five), irrespective the definition used, the coefficient of the variable personal is 
always positive and significant at a five percent level. The model with the best explanatory 
power is Model five, where personal influences are defined least strict. 
Concluding, the analysis indicates that personal influences indeed have a positive 
influence on the investment-decision. If personal aspects are present, firms are more likely 
to invest in the CEE region than those firms that did not indicate personal factors played a 
role in their decision-making. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Emotions are still largely absent in economic theory, though the inclusion of emotions 
in for example game theory or consumer behavior theory is becoming more current. 
However, in decision-making theories emotions are still not often included. This finding is 
surprising given that studies on emotions indicate that in reality they  influence decisions 
and that they can be considered a tool to ease difficult decision-making problems. 
In section two a theoretical framework is given to what extent emotions can be 
included in decision-making and at what points it is conflicting with the current 
microeconomic theories. We conclude that, instead of seeing emotions as a conflicting 
variable in economic decision-making, it can also be used as a mechanism to make these 
economic theories more functional. Emotions can for instance be considered a tool to limit 
the information to be reviewed in the decision-making process, if information provision is 
too elaborate to include in an analysis. In addition they also influence the evaluation of 
certain indicators or choices to be made. Section three provides a simple microeconomic 
model, based on utility maximization of both the firm and the decision-maker. It includes 
both economic decision-making variables and an emotional coefficient. Section four gives 
the result of an empirical test, using data from a survey among Dutch investors making an 
FDI decision to invest in Central or Eastern Europe or not (CEE region). The results in 
general indicate that personal motivations are in fact present in the decision-making 
process, both through the existence of quick – emotional – decision-making instead of a 
rational slow approach and through the inclusion of personal variables in the decision-
making analysis. Given personal influences are a channel for emotions to influence 
decisions, the data show there is reason to accept emotions influence investment-decisions 
of firms. The results indicate that emotions were more often considered by firms that 
afterwards did invest in the CEE region, than with firms that decided not to invest. A logit 
analysis was performed to see whether the reverse was also true, that the presence of 
emotional influences increases the chance that a firm will invest in the CEE region or not. 
Using several specifications for the variable personal influences, all models showed that 
indeed the personal influences had a positive and significant influence on decision-
making. 
Naturally, this research was just a first attempt to include emotions in decision-making 
theory. The theoretical part only included a first step to incorporate emotions in FDI 
decisions, keeping the model rather limited. The empirical results should be treated with 
care as well, given that the measurement of emotions is a complicated issue. However, the 
results allow to say that emotions are of importance in decision-making. Future research, 
to both the theoretical embedment in economic theory and empirical tests to the influence 
of emotions is needed. Further research can shed more light on the value added of 
inclusion of emotions in economic decision-making models, which again can lead to better 
explanatory power of the actual decision-making processes of firms. 
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Appendix 1: Analyses using unweighted and weighted survey data 
For the weighted analysis, correcting for the non-response bias, a probability is 
calculated for each respondent that a firm with certain characteristics would answer the 
survey. Characteristics used are sector, size and age of the firm. The data are weighted 
using the inverse probability of response, thus taking the non-response bias into account. 
For example, the chance that a large industrial firm responds to the survey is 0.2, or 20 
percent. In the unweighted analysis the answers of this firm are included with a weight of 
1. In the weighted analysis, the answers are valued with a factor of 1/0.2, so with a weight 
of 5. 
 
Table 1: The most important steps of decision-making; unweighted and weighted 
results 
 Investor    Non-
investor 
   
 Number 
(n=58) 
% of 
investors 
 
% of 
investors 
choice 
options 
(232 choice 
options) 
% of 
investors 
choice 
options, 
weighted 
result 
(232) 
Number 
(N=36) 
% of non-
investors 
% of non-
investors 
choice 
options 
(144  choice 
options) 
% of non-
investors 
choice 
options, 
weighted 
result (144) 
Choice 
country/location 
36 62% 16 % 16 % 14 39% 10 % 4 % ↓ 
Market analysis 23 40% 10 % 9 % 15 42% 10 % 9 % 
Choice partner 13 22% 6 % 6 % 15 42% 10 % 8 %  ↓ 
Become operational 12 21% 5 % 5 % 2 6% 1 % 1 % 
Company analysis 10 17% 4 % 3 % 15 42% 10 % 9 % 
Availability 
employees 
10 17% 4 % 4 % 2 6% 1 % 0 % 
Previous business 
relations 
9 16% 4 % 4 % 2 6% 1 % 1 % 
Personal motivations 7 12% 3 % 4 % 0 0% 0 % 0 % 
Set up legal structure 
company 
7 12% 3 % 2 % 0 0% 0 % 0 % 
Other 6 10% 3 % 2 % 6 17% 4 % 6 %  ↑ 
Contacts 5 9% 2 % 1 % 8 22% 6 % 3 %  ↓ 
Visit country 5 9% 2 % 2 % 1 3% 1 % 0 % 
Demand from CEEC 4 7% 2 % 3 % 3 8% 2 % 1 % 
Choice mode set up 
company 
4 7% 2 % 2 % 1 3% 1 % 0 % 
Preparation NL 3 5% 1 % 1 % 4 11% 3 % 2 % 
Experience 2 3% 1 % 1 % 3 8% 2 % 1 % 
Natural resources 2 3% 1 % 1 % 2 6% 1 % 0 % 
Negotiation phase 2 3% 1 % 0 % 1 3% 1 % 0 % 
Costs 2 3% 1 % 1 % 0 0% 0 % 0 % 
Media 1 2% 0 % 1 % 4 11% 3 % 3 % 
Source: Survey Dutch Direct Investment in CEEC and FSU, Maastricht University, 2000. 
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The first and second column of table one, for both the investors and non-investors, 
contain the percentages per group. For example, nine percent of the investors mentioned 
that contacts in the region were an important factor in their decision. The third and fourth 
column of the investors and non-investors compare the weighted and unweighted results, 
per answer option. Each firm had four answer possibilities, leading to a total of 322 answer 
options for investors and 144 answer options for non-investors. The results show, for 
example, that ten percent of the answers of the non-investors indicated that choosing a 
country or location for the FDI is an important step in decision-making. The weighted 
results do not differ a lot from the unweighted percentages, only for four factors for non-
investors the percentage division deviates more than one percent, and for investors there is 
no deviation between unweighted and weighted percentages larger than one percent. 
 
Table 2: Personal Factors; by investors and non-investors 
Variable Percentage of Investors for 
which this variable had impact 
on the investment decision 
Percentage of Non-investors 
for which this variable had 
impact on the investment 
decision 
 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Available contact-person in the country 69 % 60 % 63 % 76 % 
Owner, employee, partner, family, or friend of the 
Dutch firm have the nationality of the host 
economy 
19 % 19 % 9 % 4 % 
Owner, employee, partner, family, or friend of the 
Dutch firm are willing to work in that country 
14 % 11 % 14 % 11 % 
Language knowledge available 19 % 21 % 20 % 16 % 
Positive personal experiences 33 % 38 % 20 % 11 % 
Source: Survey Dutch Direct Investment in CEEC and FSU, Maastricht University, 2000 
Note: Of the 90 firms included, 56 firms were investors in the CEE region, and 34 were non-investors 
 
Table 2 shows the unweighted and weighted  percentage division of personal factors 
taken into account in the investment decision. The results of the weighted and unweighted 
analysis are not significantly different. Having a contact person in the host country is the 
most important personal factor, for both investors and non-investors. For all factors, the 
percentages of investors that mentioned the factor as important during the decision making 
are slightly higher than the percentages for non-investors. 
Table 3 includes the results of a logit analysis, testing whether the presence of personal 
influences positively affect investment decisions. Personal influences are included by 
means of 3 different dummy variables; personal1, personal2 and personal3. The first 
personal coefficient “personal1” is the strictest one. It is a dummy variable that is only 1 if 
strict personal motivations are displayed either in reasons for not making an investment 
calculationxxiv (question 21), in the open questionsxxv (question 22) or in the closed 
questionxxvi (question 23). The second variable “personal2” is an extension of the first 
one, but with a less strict definition of the context of personal involvement. The dummy 
variable is now also taking the value 1 if firms that gave as motivation to consider a certain 
country for an FDI that they have a contact person in that country, or they were invited by 
business relations to invest in that country. The third variable, “personal3”, also includes 
all those firms that did not make any investment calculation. This is the least strict 
variable, allowing for the highest amount of personal influences.  
The results of the logit analysis show that, irrespective of the definition used, personal 
motivations positively influence the decision to invest. This is true for both analyses, 
unweighted and corrected for non-response bias.   
When comparing weighted and unweighted regressions, the variable “trade” changes 
signs in model two and model three, but the variable is insignificant. The variable other is 
significant in the unweighted analysis and insignificant in the weighted analysis, in model 
one and two, and the variable age is significant in the unweighted model four, and 
insignificant in the weighted analysis. 
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Table 3: Logit analysis on who invests in the CEE region and who does not 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Basic 
Basic 
weighted 
No 
Analysis 
No 
Analysis 
weighted Personal1
Personal1
weighted Personal2
Personal2 
weighted Personal3 
Personal3
weighted 
Agriculture 0.274 0.196 0.446 0.314 -0.044 -0.072 -0.255 -0.292 -0.081 -0.026 
 (0.59) (0.39) (0.93) (0.61) (0.09) (0.14) (0.47) (0.51) (0.15) (0.05) 
Construction -0.296 -0.295 -0.129 -0.180 -0.312 -0.311 0.070 0.194 0.838 0.793 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.20) (0.28) (0.47) (0.51) (0.10) (0.32) (0.94) (0.88) 
Transport 1.210 1.448 1.149 1.300 1.146 1.520 1.385 1.724 1.477 1.712 
 (2.22)* (2.33)* (2.04)* (2.26)* (2.03)* (2.37)* (2.25)* (2.83)** (1.94) (3.64)** 
Trade 0.172 0.022 0.152 -0.015 0.065 -0.072 0.258 0.216 0.143 0.056 
 (0.42) (0.05) (0.36) (0.03) (0.15) (0.14) (0.54) (0.39) (0.28) (0.10) 
Other 1.110 1.226 1.132 1.234 0.839 0.827 0.822 0.580 0.819 0.744 
 (2.18)* (1.78) (2.17)* (1.77) (1.55) (1.15) (1.38) (0.58) (1.27) (0.72) 
Age -0.014 -0.019 -0.012 -0.019 -0.013 -0.019 -0.013 -0.015 -0.009 -0.012 
 (2.41)* (2.05)* (2.13)* (1.96) (2.21)* (2.26)* (2.14)* (1.86) (1.38) (1.50) 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.43) (0.94) (1.57) (1.12) (1.60) (0.85) (1.92) (1.41) (2.65)** (1.98)* 
No analysis   1.359 1.110       
   (3.40)** (2.47)*       
Personal1     1.640 2.156     
     (4.26)** (4.36)**     
Personal2       2.353 2.708   
       (6.70)** (6.02)**   
Personal3         3.771 3.617 
         (6.91)** (5.36)** 
Constant -0.445 -0.310 -0.754 -0.513 -0.731 -0.731 -1.432 -1.594 -3.171 -2.935 
 (1.46) (0.76) (2.31)* (1.19) (2.26)* (1.84) (3.76)** (3.16)** (5.23)** (3.97)** 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.0811 0.1093 0.1031 0.1346 0.2011 0.2476 0.2973 0.3849 0.3802 
Source: Survey Dutch Direct Investment in CEEC and FSU, Maastricht University, 2000 
225 observations 
1) The sector Industry is taken as baseline sector. 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent 
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Appendix 2 Questions related to personal influences included in the 
survey  
   
21. Did you make any investment analysis to estimate the possibility of success of the investment?  
 (only 1 answer possible) 
 1  [] Yes, only for the country of the 1st investment  
 2  []  Yes, for the country of our 1st investment and multiple   
  other countries  
3  [] No, no calculation was made. The company chose for  
  the country of our 1st investment because: ...................................................................... 
   
22.  What were the 4 most important actions during  your decision making process,  in 
chronological order (for instance fist the choice of a country, afterwards the search for an 
appropriate local partner). 
 (please enter in each box an action of your investment decision making progress,    
 in chronological order) 
 1. ................................................................................................................................ 
 2. ................................................................................................................................ 
 3. ................................................................................................................................ 
 4. ................................................................................................................................ 
 
23. Which one of the following aspects was a specific reason for your company to make the investment 
analysis for the country of your 1st investment? 
 (multiple answers possible) 
 1  [] There was already a trade relation with one or more companies in that country 
 2  [] There was a good contact-person to work with in that country 
 3  [] Other companies in that sector achieved good results in that country  
 4  [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm are from that country 
 5  [] Your partner or direct family members are from the country of your 1st investment 
 6  [] Friends or acquaintances are from the country of your 1st investment 
 7  [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm were willing to work in the country of your 1st  
investment 
 8  [] Your partner or direct family was willing to work in the country of your 1st    
   investment 
 9  [] Friends or acquaintances were willing to work in the country of your 1st investment 
 10  [] Language knowledge of the country of your 1st  investment in the Dutch firm available 
 11  [] Positive personal experiences in the country of your 1st investment,  for instance because of travel 
experiences 
 12 [] Other, namely: ………………………………………………………………………. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
i In fact basic economic theory requires three sets of assumptions to hold:  
- Limited and given resources, given tastes/preferences and given technology; 
- Pure economic goods, perfect information and perfect competition; 
- Absence of value judgments; 
ii Simon (1997), Models of Bounded Rationality, chapter IV.1.  
iii There is “a network if individuals are variably connected to one another as a function of prior contact, exchange and 
attendant emotions” (Burt, 2000). 
iv Cognitive learning theories and social learning theories describe the possible effects of experience (Martin, 2001). 
The basis of cognitive learning is that individuals develop cognitive frameworks that allow them to interact more 
effective in a certain environment. Experience assists the individual in decision-making, determining behavioral 
options and choosing a certain behavior. Social and experiential learning relates to the idea that within each 
environment people learn and experience different things and thus automatically learn different things that are 
attached to that specific social setting. 
v Being economists, we abstain from the psychological discussions surrounding the concept of emotions and settle 
for a definition that is commonly used and suitable for this paper, without entering the discussion what to include or 
exclude. 
vi Emotions always have an intentional object, being a person or a state of affairs (envy at someone, sad because of 
something). Emotional states are characterized by hormonal changes and changes in the autonomic nervous system 
and have characteristic observable expressions (for instance a smile). Emotions can be located on a pleasure-pain 
scale, including a neutral point of emotional indifference (valence) and often lead to action tendencies (for instance 
anger and hurting someone, love and touching, shame and hiding) (Frijda, 1986). 
vii They can avoid situations in which they know they will face emotions (for example a person that is alcohol addicted 
can avoid going to bars), or they can equip themselves with strategies to deal with the emotion (for instance angry 
people often use the “golden rule“ count to 10 before responding, instead of responding immediately), but they 
cannot avoid emotions in itself. 
viii Loewenstein (2000) mentions the example of a road-rage. When asked in advance, people recognize that it is not 
in their self-interest to assault another driver that they find irritating, but in real life emotions do often lead to such 
assaults. Another example is given by Kaufman (1999) in his illustration of a homosexual man being infected with the 
HIV virus due to unsafe sex practice. The man admitted it was not in his self-interest to practice unsafe sex, but 
driven by the emotion of happiness and love this knowledge became less important. Especially in this last example 
the short-term emotions driving a decision lead to very important consequences. 
ix It is commonly know that, even though rationally risks remain constant, it feels as if risks become higher when they 
come closer. For example, a war is more threatening if it is between your neighboring countries instead of at the 
other side of the world. Equally, a country can have consistent mediate risk ratings, but feels more risky if you have to 
live there with your family. Or, a bungee jump today is considered scarier than a bungee jump next year, even though 
the risks remain equal.  
x An example Hanoch (2002) mentions is an individual walking through the woods with the aim to pick blueberries. At 
some point this individual encounters a snake and jumps back. At that point the priorities have shifted; instead of 
picking blueberries, survival became priority number one. The individual did not analytically calculate the costs if 
jumping back, the probabilities of being bitten and the revenues of having blueberries, but intuitively decided to jump 
back – the optimal solution. 
xi See also Wadeson (2000). 
xii This NPV decision-making model could in principle be replaced by any other economic decision-making model, 
such as the option models, without changing the fundamental idea described. 
xiii In the case of several decision-makers, the sum of their personal utility can be included here. 
xiv The model is following the discrimination theory of Becker, 1971.  
xv The difference between for instance slightly negative, neutral (0) and slightly positive emotions on utility is larger 
than the difference between positive and very positive emotions. Therefore the marginal utility is positive but small at 
very negative and very positive levels of EC. 
xvi An example of an investment-decision is a manager of a small company that considers investing in Hungary, 
including the fact that the manager has to move to Hungary. If he expects Hungary to be a profitable market 
(U(NPV>0) and also is having positive emotions with respect to Hungary, (U(EC)>0), he will definitely invest in the 
country. However, if the business-economic calculations are positive (U(NPV)>0) but the manager is totally against 
living in Hungary (U(EC)→ -∞), he will decide not to invest. 
xvii The selection of firms this survey is taken from a database the Dutch chambers of commerce collected of firm that 
participated in seminars on investments in transition countries or asked for information materials concerning foreign 
investments. Inherently this firm selection method results in a bias of respondents compared to the overall population 
of Dutch firms. The respondents are more interested in international activities and more often are involved in 
international trade and direct investments than the average Dutch firm. However, given that the purpose of the 
research is to analyze investment-decision processes of firms, this bias is considered an advantage for this research.  
xviii Investors are firms that at the time of the survey had an FDI in the CEE region, non-investors are those firms that 
were interested in the CEE region, but decided not to invest. 
xix For each of the variables a Pearson chi2 test was done, to see whether the data for investors and non-investors 
are independent. In none of the cases was the difference in outcomes between investors and non-investors 
significant. 
xx Six dummy variables are defined using 1-digit SBI code, with Agriculture, including Agriculture (A), Fishery (B) and 
Natural resources, Industry (D), Construction (F), Transport (I), Trade (K) and Other including E (Electricity, Gas and 
Water), H (Hotel, Restaurants), J (Financial institutions), L (Government/NGO), M (Education), N (Health), O 
(Environment), P (Private households) and Q (Extraterritorial bodies).  
xxi All firms older than 100 years are included as being 100 years old. 
xxii As primary source the answers from the questionnaire are taken. We included the number of employees of 1989, 
1994 or 1999, depending on which year closest preceded the year of the investment-decision. Whenever data for 
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that specific year were missing, we used the number of employees from the later years as proxy. 
 
xxiv The dummy variable is set at 1 if the reasons for not making an investment calculation is a personal one (see 
table 1) 
xxv The dummy variable is set at 1 if in the open question the firms answer fell in the category personal motivations 
(see table 2) 
xxvi The dummy variable is set at 1 if the answer options “the owner, friends or family are from the host country”, “the 
owner, friends or family are willing to work in the host country”, “someone from the firm speaks the language of the 
host country” or “the firm had positive experiences in that country” were marked as motivations for the investment 
(table 3). 
